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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN R. SWAUGER,
A ppellam.t,

Case No.

-vs.-

7316

W. C. LAWLER,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appealed From the Third Judicial District Court In and
For Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
HoNORABLE CLARENCE E. BAKER and.
RAY VANCoTT, JR., Judges

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment of "No Cause of
Action" entered against the plaintiff-appellant, and in
favor of the defendant-respondent. The notice of appeal
indicates that the appeal is taken from the findings of
fact, and judgment, and from the order of the District
Court vacating and setting aside the judgment formerly
entered April 9, 1948 in favor of the plaintiff-appellant,
and against the defendant-respondent. (R. 54.)
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The respondent deems the statement of facts as outlined by the appellant to be insufficient, and will hereafter set forth certain additional facts. Before doing
so however, respondent raises three points which are
believed to be determinative of this appeal, and which
preclude a consideration of the matters raised by the
Appellant on this appeal.
POINT I.
Since No Bill of Excep,tions Was Filed or Settled, the Appeal
Is On the Judgment Roll Only, and the Only Question for
Review is. the Question of the Sufficiency of the Pleadings
To Sustain the Judgment.

No bill of exceptions was served, settled or filed in
this action, and for that reason, there is nothing before
the court to review except the matters presented by the
judgment roll. Byron v. Utah Copper Co., 53 Utah 151,
178 Pac. 53; Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 Pa.c.
214.
The cases are numerous holding that when no bill
of exceptions is filed, the only question that can be determined is whether the pleadings are sufficient to support the findings and judgment. Coates v. Allen, 88
Utah 545, 56 P. 2d 612; Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah
157, 292 Pac. 214; Hutchinson v. Smart, 51 Utah 172,
169 Pac. 166; Metz v. Jackson, 43 Utah 496, 136 Pac.
784; Bryant v. Kunkel, 32 Utah 377, 90 Pac. 1039; Gray
v. Defa, 103 Utah 342, 135 P. 2d 251; Atkinson v. Pelligrino, 110 Utah 363, 173 P. 2d 543.
2
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POINT II.
The Pleadings are Sufficient to Sustain the Judgment of
No Cause of Action.
While this matter is raised by the appellant's notice of appeal, it is not assigned as error in the statement of issues, nor is it argued by the appellant in his
brief. See Coates v. Allen, 88 Utah 545, 56 P. 2d 612;
where the effect of such failure is fully discussed, and
under facts similar to the present case on this point, the
Supreme Court held that there was nothing to review.
The pleadings indicate that the plaintiff was proceeding upon the theory of a loan. The amended answer
and the second amended answer both affirmatively allege a business enterprise entered into by the plaintiff,
the defendant, and others, whereby this money allegedly
loaned to the defendant was actually a contribution toward the capital of the business venture. The findings
uphold the defendant that this was in fact so, and the
court entered its judgment of ''No Cause of Action''.
There is nothing irregular in the judgment roll relative
to the pleadings, findings of fact, conclusions of law, or
judgment.
When an appeal is taken on the judgment roll alone,
the Supreme Court is bound to assume that the findings
of the trial court were true and supported by the evidence. Byron v. Utah Copper Co., 53 Utah 151, 178 Pac.
53; Atkinson v. Pellegrino, 110 Utah 358, 173 P. 2d 543.
POINT III.
Having Failed to Serve, File and Settle a Bill of Exceptions,
Relating to the Proceedings Had Whereby the Prior
Judgment Was Set Aside, the Appellant Has F'ailed to
Preserve This Issue for Review by the· Supreme Court.
3
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The motion to open or vacate a judgment under
Section 104-14-4 U.C.A. 1943, affidavits and othe-r proceedings had in support thereof, and the rulings and
orders of court in regard thereto are no part of the
judgment roll. Section 104-39-4, U.C.A. 1943. In order
for the appellant to preserve this matter for review
upon appeal he must have presented a bill of exceptions
in the proper manner in order that this court might pass
upon the questions, and in the absence of such a bill of
exceptions, there is nothing before this court to be reviewed.
In the case of Johnson v. Continental Casualty Co.,
78 Utah 18, 300 Pac. 1032, at page 22, this rule is an,..
nounced in the following language:

'' * * * The application for relief under section 6619 (present section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943)
presents an issue which must be tried by the
court as any other issue, and before any party
is entitled to have a decision on such an issue
reviewed on appeal it is necessary that the proceedings had thereunder be incorporated in a
bill of exceptions duly authenticated by the certificate of the judge. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec.
6971 ; Somers v. Somers, 81 Cal. 608, 22 P. 967.
The matter of granting relief under section 6619
(104-14-4) rests largely within the sound discretion of the court to which the application is made,
and his rulings with respect thereto will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it is made apparent
that the court has abused such discretion. Clearly, the party who seeks a reversal of such an
order has the duty o£ bringing to this court a
properly authenticated record by a bill of exceptions of the proceeding had before the court on
that particular issue. This was not done, and for
4
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that reason the motion of respondent must prevail.
Since no ruling is presented for review, except as is required to be exhibited by a bill of exceptions, and since there is no bill, it follows that
the judgment of the district court must be, and
the same is affirmed.
Other cases to like effect are Madsen, et al, v. Hodson, et al., 69 Utah 527, 256 Pac. 792; Cornelius v. Mohave Oil Co., 66 Utah 22, 239 Pac. 475; and see generally
on this question Evans v. Jones, 10 Utah 182, 37 Pac.
262, and J\tfcCullough v. McCullough, 37 Utah 148, 106
Pac. 665.
In the case of Madsen v. Hodson, supra, a bill of
exceptions had been filed ; however, the bill of exceptions
contained only a minute entry which purported to record
the action of the court in overruling a motion to vacate
the judgment. The record did disclose the motions made,
and the supporting affidavits apparently, but these matters were not to be found in the settled bill of exceptions.
This Supreme Court held that the matter was not before
it for review, in the following language:
'' * * * The very purpose of asking this court
to review a ruling of the trial court on a motion
of this nature is to· determine whether the court
abused its discretion. The motion, if there was
one, to vacate the judgment, and the evidence in
support of that motion, not being properly certified to this court, cannot be reviewed by us. Every
presumption is that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion. ' '
See also the case of Naisbitt v. Herrick, 76 Utah
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575, 290 Pac. 950, wherein the necessity for a bill of
exceptions covering proceedings had under Section 10414-4, U.C.A. 1943, is further recognized, and for a case
wherein such a bill of exceptions was properly brought,
and the matter reviewed.
"An examination of Section 104-30-14, U.C.A.
1943, indicates that the motion to set aside or
vacate judgment, affidavits in support thereof,
and order and proceedings had thereon are not
a part of the judgment roll, unless a bill of exceptions is preserved on these points and included
in the appeal.''
ADDITIONAL STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
While respondent takes the position that the-re IS
nothing before the court to be reviewed relative to the
order of the District Court opening and vacating the
former judgment, and that therefore the appeal must
be determined in favor of the respondent, he nonetheless, without waiving said position desires to answer
the arguments of the appellant, and meet the issues
raised by appellant in his brief, and in order to do so,
it is felt that an additional statem~nt of facts might be
helpful to the court.
The appellant and the respondent, together with
J. E. Rafferty (R. 29) and one Weston Daines (Def. Ex.
1, R. 56) proposed the purchase of an airplane for their
joint use and benefit (R. 48). The parties purchased the
airplane in September, 1946, in the name of Air Service
Inc., a corporation to be formed. The appellant gave to
the respondent his check for $1,000.00 (Pl. Ex. A) to
ward the purchase price of said airplane which sum was
6
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utilized, together with sums of money similarly contributed by Raferty (R. 29) and respondent.
The parties consulted counsel for the purpose of
incorporating this joint venture. The articles of incorporation were signed but they were never filed, and a
charter never issued by the State of Utah. The said corporation was never completed due to sudden financial
reverses requiring full attentio~ of the parties to other
matters. The airplane was purchased in the summer of
1946 and used intermittently until the spring of 1947,
at which time the parties were unable to maintain installment payments required under the contract of purchase,
and the lienholder repossessed said airplane. The net
result of this venture was a loss of ail the funds which
had been invested in said airplane, and which fund.s included the $1,000.00 which appellant later alleges was
a loan. (R. 1.)
A complaint was filed in the Third Judicial District
Court on January 16, 1947 (R. 1) by Barclay and Barclay, appellant's counsel who later withdrew. (R. 6.)
1

The case was set for April 7, 1948. The day before
the trial the respondent was driving from Ashton, Idaho
to Salt Lake City, to appear at the trial (R. 28) the following day, April 7th. While enroute, he became ill due
to a severe attack of hemorrhoids and was unable to
drive his automobile, so he parked on the highway and
attended to himself. Respondent was unable to reach
Salt Lake City in time for the trial. He sent a telegram
to his counsel the morning of April 7th, requesting a
continuance. The telegram did not reach the counsel in
7
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time. The counsel representing respondent at this the
first trial was an associate sent over to court by the
respondent's retained counsel of record, McKay, Burton
and White. Reed Richards (R. 11) who appeared at the
first trial was not known and is still not known to the
respondent, nor was he his attorney. Richards asked
for a continuance which was denied. After hearing the
evidence of the plaintiff only, judgment was granted as
prayed.
Judgment was entered on April 9, 1948, by the
clerk of the court. A motion for a new trial made on
April 12, 1948, was denied on May 22, 1948 (R. 21).
Thereafter, on July 8th, within 90 days as provided for
in Section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943, respondent, through his
present counsel filed a motion to open or vacate the
judgment on grounds provided in section 104-14-4, together with his affidavit (R. 48) in support thereof.
This motion and affidavit interposing his defense for
the first time was heard by th-e same Judge who heard
the original motion for a new trial. This motion was
granted.
PO:JNT IV.
The Motion to Open or Vacate Judgment Filed By the
Respondent Was Filed Under the Provisions of Section
104-14-4, U .C.A.. 1943, to Vacate or Open a J udgmenJt on
the Grounds of Excusable Neglect, as Provided
By That Section.

This was not a motion to allow the defendant (Respondent) to file a motion for a new trial, as where he
has failed within the requisite time under section 10440-4, U.C.A. 1943, to file such motion, and he thereafter
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seeks permission to do so. Such a proceeding is provided
for under Section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943, as is also the
proceeding \Yhich the respondent in fact instituted. The
distinction between the two is clearly set forth in the
ease of Thomas v. ~iorris, 8 Utah 284; and in Madsen v.
Hodson, 69 Utah 527, 256 Pa.c. 792.
The case of Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 Pac.
1023, relied upon by the appellant, has no application
to such a motion as "'"a.s here filed. The Luke v. Coleman ease \Yas one \vherein the losing party filed a motion for new trial whieh motion was argued and decided
adversely to him. He thereafter filed a motion for a rehearing and reargument of the motion for new trial.
The Supreme Court held that the District Court had no
power to entertain such a mot-ion, that it "Tas not a
recognized pleading.
The grounds for setting aside a judgment for excusable neglect whereby the respondent was precluded
by his unavoidable absence from setting up what later
proved to be a valid defense, differs vastly from the
review upon the ordinary motion for a new trial under
Section 104-40-4. Judge Baker of the District Court,
heard both motions.-Ne\v Trial (R. 21) Motion to open
or vacate judgment (R. 33, 34). Obviously he considered
the grounds. in the second instance to be sufficiently
different and that the defendant had been precluded
from setting up his defense under circumstances which
would justify a vacation of the original judgment, and
for this reason he vacated the judgment, in order to
promote substantial justice bet,veen the parties as \vas
his discretionary power under Section 10!-14-4, U.C.A.
9
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1943. What the substance of the argument was in the
court below on the motion for new trial does not appear
from the record before the Supreme Court. Present·
counsel for the respondent, did not represent respondent
in the proceedings~ had to that point. If, as argued by
the appellant, the same matters were gone into in both
instances, seemingly the burden should be upon appellant to sustain his position. Respondent's position in
this regard is sustained by the ruling of Judge Baker,
by his order vacating the former judgment upon the
showing made before h~m on that matter. "Every presumption is that the trial court did not abuse its discretion". Madsen v. Hodson, 69 Utah 527, 256 Pac. 792.
Respondent takes the position that the fact that Judge
Baker made both rulings, (Denial of motion for new
trial, and order opening and vacating judgment) is
strongly indicative that different matters were encompassed in the two motions. Certainly the court cannot
say from anything which appears before it, that the
grounds were the same.
POINT V.
The Nature of th-e Respondent's Defense Below Was Such
That It Was Necessary F'or Him To Be Personally Present.

If the motion, affidavits and order on the motion
to vacate or open the judgment are before the court, and
this latter part of respondent's brief is predicated upon
that supposition, then the nature of the respondent's
defense in this matter is set forth, and it was apparent
that his presence was absolutely necessary in order to
properly and adequately present that defense. The trial
court, .on the showing before it, exercised his discretion

10
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in the matter, and upon a trial of the issue on its merits
before yet another judge the defense was interposed
and sustained. It is submitted that this honorable court
should not under such facts and circumstances overrule
the lo·w·er court. The rna tter of granting relief under
this section rests largely \Yi thin the sound discretion
of the court to \Yhich application is made. Johnson v.
Cont. Casualty Co., 78 Utah 18, 300 Pac. 1032; Hurd v.
Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 Pac. ·908; Blythe and Fargo Co.
v. s,,~ensen, 15 Utah 345, 49 Pac. 1027; Thomas v. Morris,
8 Utah 284.
POINT VI.
Section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943, is Designed to Insure Insofar
As Possible That Parties Litigant Will Be Protected Where
Misfortune of the Type and Nature Set Forth Herein
Has Occurred.

While it is true that many of the cases wherein the
court's have vacated judgments, have been cases wherein
default judgments have been entered, the statute in no
way limits its use to those cases, nor has the Supreme
Court so construed it. Appellant concedes that not all
cases where relief has been granted are default cases.
Where the facts bring the case within the section of the
statute, and the court in the exercise of its wise discretion has determined that the facts are sufficient upon
which to grant the relief authorized in the statute, and
a trial on the merits in which the resporulent's defense
is fully sustained, the respondent takes the position that
this court should not seek to restrict the use of this
remedy, particularly in view of the fact that the merits
11
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of respondent's defense have been upheld, and the appellant has not sought to review those merits.
Appellant relies upon the case of Campbell v. Union
Savings & Investment Company, 63 Utah 336, 226 Pac.
190, in support of his contention that the lower court
erred in granting the motion to vacate judgment. The
facts of that case reveal that it was a. suit to quiet. title.
The question was whether the court abused its discretion in failing or refusing to vacate the judgment. The
court tried the case in the absence of the defendant and
its attorney and this was relied upon by the defendant
in that case. Defendant's attorney contended that he
did not have proper notice of the trial date, therefore
judgment should be set aside. The Supreme Court sustained the trial court and denied the defendant's motion
to vacate.
In the present case, there was no default, nor any
contention of lack of notice. What the defendant ( respondent) did by his motion was to ask for his day in
court in order to interpose his defense, and the basis of
his motion was that of excusable neglect and illness.
This differs vastly from the failure of the defendant's
attorney in the Campbell case to 'diligently discover that
the case was to be tried, where court rules relative to
such notice had been complied with.
Appellant also relies upon the case of Peterson v.
Crozier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860. This was a seduction
case. The defendant did not appear at the trial although
he had ample notice of the time and place where it was
to be held. His excuse was that he could not leave his
job for he would lose it. The Supreme Court on review
12
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sustained the lo\Yer court in holding that this was not
excusable neglect, stating that the affidavit rather than
sho,ving excusable neglect, tended to show a deliberate
intention on his part to abandon his defense and permit
the plaintiff to take a. judgment against him. In the
present case the defendant "\Yas sick and ill enroute to
the trial, and although represented by an attorney, it
"·as other than counsel actually retained by him, and
one who did not kno"\v the facts of the case, nor have the
file of the case.
It should further be borne in mind that in the
present case the lower court upheld the contention that
excusable neglect existed, and he vacated the judgment.
The review is only as to abuse of discretion, and where
he is supported as in the present case, there is no abuse
of discretion shown. The two cases relied upon by appellant are distinguishable, but they do have one feature
in common-the court in each instance held that there
was no abuse of discretion. Respondent contends that
such should be the ruling in the present case.
The court having exercised its discretion in this
matter, there is no merit in the contention that laches,
even if available to appellant in this action, should act
as a bar to the respondent. There is nothing to indicate
in any event that appellant should prevail under a
theory of laches since all that is shown is the bare passage of 90 days' time from the entry of judgment, and
only a matter of 46 days from the overruling. of his
motion for a new trial. Something more than the mere
passage of time is contemplated in order that a party
may prevail under the doctrine of laches. Mary J a.ne
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Stevens Co. v. First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456,
57 P. 2d 1099. There is nothing indicating any change
of position, nor does the appellant so argue. He argues
that there has been hardship on the plaintiff in having
to return to again fight the case. This argument loses
sight of the equities as between the parties. The court
in the second instance held that the plaintiff did not
have a cause of action at all. He cannot be heard to
complain that having recovered a judgment on a claimed
cause of action that had no validity, that he has been
injured when the gain in the form of the judgment has
been taken away from him where the court has ruled
that he is not entitled to that gain. What tiie court did
in vacating the first judgment was clearly ''in furtherance of justice" (Section 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943).
The time for filing an appeal from the original
judgment had not run when respondent entered his motion before the court to vacate or open the judgment.
It is difficult to see how laches could bar the respondent
from one type of relief authorized by the statute during
the time when that relief is available to him in the discretion of the court, when no other of his rights under
other statutes have expired.
The appellant's statement of the issue relative to
laches is that respondent is barred from asserting an
affidavit to support a motion for new trial, because such
affidavit was not filed at the time the motion for new
trial was filed. Since the rna tter in issue is a motion to
vacate or open a judgment on the grounds of excusable
neglect, this assertion is without merit.

14
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POINT VII.
There Was No Error or Abuse of Discretion on the Part
of the Court in Permitting Amendment of the Answer.

The second amended answer was filed to comply
""ith the order of court to enable the pleadings to conform to the proofs. There was an immaterial variance
'vhich the second amended answer corrected. An examination of the amended answer and the second amended
answer, together with the findings of fact, will disclose
that the variance was not a. material one. The respondent's theory was that the appellant had engaged in a
business enterprise with the respondent and others. The
exact nature of that enterprise is immaterial. The important thing is the determination that he did in fact
enter into such au enterprise. The amended answer
alleged this to be a. corporation, the proofs established
a joint venture.
The amended answer was interposed in order that
defendant might properly take advantage of the defense available to him. The judgment had previously
been vacated, and an affidavit filed setting forth the
substance and nature of the proposed defense, and
therefore the appellant had notice of the proposed defense. It was a matter of discretion with the court
whether he would allow such amendment. There was no
abuse of that discretion.
The case of McMillan v. Forsythe, 47 Utah 571, 154
Pac. 959, has no application to this case.
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CONCLUSION
It IS respectfully submitted ~hat there is nothing
before this honorable court whereby a review can be had
of the proceedings relating to the motion to vacate or
open the judgment and proceedings had thereon, and
that the lower court should be affirmed on the judgment
roll, since no other contention is made in this appeal,
save those matters referring to the motion and proceedings had subsequent thereto. The pleadings amply sustain the judgment on the merits.
If the motion and proceedings subsequent thereto
are properly before this honorable court, then it is
respectfully submitted that the proceedings sustain the
district court in its vacation of the judgment, and there
is nothing indicating an abuse of that discretion, and
the appellants position on appeal is without merit.
Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

LEONARD S. RALPH,
Attorney for Respondent
and. Defendant.
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